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ABSTRACT: The main purpose of structural health monitoring (SHM) is to provide accurate and real-
time information about the state of a structure, which can be used as objective inputs for decision-making 
regarding its management. However, SHM and decision-making occur at various stages. SHM assesses 
the state of a structure based on the acquisition and interpretation of data, which is usually provided by 
sensors. Conversely, decision-making helps us to identify the optimal management action to undertake. 
Generally, the research community recognizes people tend to use irrational methods for their 
interpretation of monitoring data, instead of rational algorithms such as Bayesian inference. People use 
heuristics as efficient rules to simplify complex problems and overcome the limits in rationality and 
computation of the human brain. Even though the results are typically satisfactory, they can differ from 
results derived from a rational process; psychologists call these differences cognitive biases. Many 
heuristic behaviors have been studied and demonstrated, with applications in various fields such as 
psychology, cognitive science, economics and finance, but not yet to SHM-based decision problems. 
SHM-based decision making is particularly susceptible to the representativeness heuristic, where 
simplified rules for updating probabilities can distort the decision maker’s perception of risk. In this 
work, we examine how this heuristic affects the interpretation of data, providing a deeper understanding 
of the differences between a heuristic method affected by cognitive biases and the classical approach. 
Our study is conducted both theoretically through comparison with formal Bayesian methods as well as 
empirically through the application to a real-life case study in the field of civil engineering. With this 
application we demonstrate the heuristic framework and we show how this cognitive bias affects 
decision-making by distorting the representation of information provided by SHM. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Structural health monitoring (SHM) is commonly 
seen as a powerful tool that allows bridge 
managers to make decisions on maintenance, 
reconstruction and repair of their assets. The logic 
of making decision based on SHM is formally 
stated in Cappello et al. (Cappello, et al., 2016), 
under the assumption that the decision maker is an 
ideal rational agent, who judges using Bayes’ 
theorem (Bolstad, 2010), and decides consistently 
with Neumann-Morgenstern’s Expected Utility 
Theory (EUT) (Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). 
However, we often observe real-life decision 
makers departing from this ideal model of 
rationality, judging and deciding using common 
sense and privileging fast and frugal heuristics to 
rational analytic thinking. Hence, if we wish to 
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describe mathematically and predict the choices 
of a real word bridge manager, we have to accept 
that their behavior may not be necessarily fully 
rational. Biased judgement and decision making 
have been widely reported and investigated 
starting the 1970s in the fields of cognitive 
sciences, social sciences and behavioral 
economics: key papers include the fundamental 
works by Kahneman and Tversky (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972) 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973); Kahneman’s 
famous textbook (Gilovich, et al., 2002) is an 
exhaustive reference for those approaching the 
topic for the first time. Apparent irrational 
behavior in SHM-based bridge management is 
reported in (Zonta, et al., 2014) and suggested in 
(Cappello, et al., 2016). Another typical example 
of cognitive bias frequently observed in bridge 
management, is the confusion between condition 
state and safety of a bridge, as reported for 
example in (Zonta, et al., 2007). We remind here 
for clarity that safety is about the capacity of a 
bridge to withstand the traffic loads and the other 
external actions without collapsing, while the 
condition state expresses the degree of 
deterioration of a bridge respect to its design state. 
The condition state is usually apprised through a 
combination of routing visual inspections, non-
destructive evaluation and SHM. It is expressed in 
the form of a condition index that depends on the 
particular management system. For example, 
bridge management systems based on AASHTO 
Commonly Recognized (CoRe) Standard Element 
System, such as the APT-BMS reported in (Zonta, 
et al., 2007), classify the state of an element on a 
scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means ‘as per design’ 
and 5 corresponds to the most severe observable 
deterioration state. On the contrary, the safety of 
a bridge is typically encoded in its probability of 
failure PF, reliability index β, or safety factor γ, 
evaluated through formal structural analysis. 
Condition state and safety are obviously 
correlated (logically, the load-carrying capacity of 
a deteriorated bridge is equal or lower than that of 
the same bridge in undamaged condition) but are 
not the same thing. For example, an old bridge can 
be unsafe, regardless its preservation state, simply 
because designed to an old code, which does not 
comply with the current load demand. As a 
counterexample, we may have the case of bridge, 
severely deteriorated, but still with enough 
capacity to safely withstand all the external loads, 
either because overdesigned or simply because its 
deterioration does not affect its load-carrying 
capacity. In principle, rational bridge 
management should target the safety of the bridge 
stock, and therefore prioritize retrofit of unsafe 
bridges, regardless they degree of deterioration. In 
practice we frequently observe that bridge 
managers tend to delay retrofit of substandard 
bridges which do not show sign of deterioration, 
while repair promptly deteriorated bridges as soon 
as the damage is observed, regardless their actual 
residual load-carrying capacity. The biased 
rationale behind this apparent behavior is that 
undamaged bridges ‘look’ safe, while damaged 
bridges ‘look’ unsafe, simply because we know 
that deterioration negatively affects safety. 
The ambition of this paper is to tackle 
mathematically this observed biased judgement, a 
condition that, we will show, is broadly described 
by Kahneman and Tversky’s representativeness 
heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). We begin 
reminding, in Section 2, the formal framework of 
rational decision based on SHM information. We 
introduce the concept of heuristic in Section 3, 
focusing in detail on the representativeness. In 
Section 4 we use representativeness models to 
reproduce the biased evaluation of the safety of a 
bridge concrete slab, based on the condition state 
apprised through visual inspections. Concluding 
remarks are presented at the end of the paper. 
2. SHM-BASED DECISION MAKING 
RATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
We refer to the problem of optimal decision based 
on data provided by visual inspection or SHM. 
Generally speaking, this is a two-step process, as 
shown in Figure 1, which includes the judgement 
of the state h based on the observations y, and the 
decision of the optimal action aopt based on the 
uncertain knowledge of the state. 
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Figure 1: The rational process of an SHM-based decision problem. 
Assume that the safety state of the bridge is 
described by one of n mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive state hypothesis ℋ = 
{h1,h2,…,hj, … , hn}  (e.g.: h1  = ’safe’, h2  = 
’failure’, …). Further assume that observing the 
bridge, or element, either through visual 
inspection or SHM, ultimately consists of 
assessing its condition out of a number of m 
possible classes  C1,C2,…,Ci,…,Cm  which 
express its degree of damage or deterioration (e.g. 
C1 = ’not damaged’, C2 = ’moderately damaged’, 
C3 = ’severely damaged’). Therefore, the value of 
an observation y
i
, is one of the possible condition 
classes: y
i
∈{C1,C2,C3,C4,C5} . Multiple 
independent observations on the same bridge may 
occur because of repeated inspections by different 
inspectors, or redundant independent 
measurements by the monitoring system. We 
indicate with vector y the full set of observations 








} . The likelihood of 
condition Ci  for a bridge/element in state hj  is 
encoded in the probabilistic distribution P(Ci|hj). 
If we restrict the problem to a single-observation 
case, the first step of the process consists of 
judging the state of a structure hj based on the i-th 
class observed Ci. In the presence of uncertainty, 
the state of the structure after observing the class 
Ci is probabilistically described by the posterior 
P(hj|Ci), and the inference process followed by a 
rational agent is mathematically developed in the 





where P(hj|Ci) is the posterior knowledge of the 
structural state and represents the best estimation 
after the acquisition of SHM observation; it 
depends on the likelihood P(Ci|hj)  and on the 
prior knowledge P(hj), which is our estimate of hj 
before the acquisition of the observation. P(Ci) is 
simply a normalization constant, called evidence. 
The second step starts after the assessment of the 
posterior probability of the structure, and 
concerns choosing the ‘best’ action based on 
Expected utility theory (EUT) axioms. EUT, 
introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern in 
1944 (Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) and later 
developed in the form that we currently know by 
Raiffa and Schlaifer in 1961 (Raiffa & Schlaifer, 
1961), describes the analysis of decision making 
under risk and is considered as a normative model 
of rational choice (Parmigiani & Inoue, 2009). 
In conclusion, Bayes theorem and EUT 
provide a rational method to solve respectively the 
two steps of a classical SHM-based decision 
process, as shown in Figure 1. However, most 
people use heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974) (Gilovich, et al., 2002) to determine their 
action which does not coincide with the rational 
decision. Therefore, we will investigate the 
impact of the representativeness heuristic on 
classical SHM-based decision problems. 
3. THE REPRESENTATIVENESS 
HEURISTIC 
The concept of heuristic has been subject to 
several definitions during the history and 
everyone who made use of the term seemed 
obliged to give his own interpretation of it. A very 
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important contribution is the work of Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky in the early 1970s, 
which revolutionized the academic research on 
human judgment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). They developed 
the so–called heuristics and biases approach, 
challenging the dominance of strictly rational 
models. The main innovation lays in the analysis 
of the descriptive adequacy of ideal models of 
judgment and in the proposal of a cognitive 
alternative that explained human error without 
invoking motivated irrationality. In this paper we 
want to focus on the representativeness, which 
seems the most affecting heuristic in judgments 
under uncertainty: events are ranked according to 
their representativeness and people consistently 
judge the more representative event to be the more 
likely, whether it is or not (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1972). Its definition was: “A person who follows 
this heuristic evaluates the probability of an 
uncertain event, or a sample, by the degree to 
which it is: (i) similar in essential properties to its 
parent population; and (ii) reflects the salient 
features of the process by which it is generated”. 
This means that an event A is judged more 
probable than an event B whenever A appears 
more representative than B, that is, the ordering of 
events by their subjective probabilities coincides 
with their ordering by representativeness. 
Therefore, to be representative an uncertain event 
should not only be similar to its parent population, 
but it should also reflect the properties of the 
uncertain process by which it is generated, i.e. it 
should reflect the idea of randomness. There are 
various models attempting to explain this 
heuristic from a mathematical perspective, see for 
example  (Edward, 1968),  (Grether, 1980), 
(Grether, 1992), (Gigerenzer, 1995), (Barberis, et 
al., 1998),  (Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2011), 
(Bordalo, et al., 2016). While introducing the 
models, we want to point and analyze the two 
main aspects regarding the definition of 
representativeness and its application: what is the 
representativeness and how is defined among the 
different authors? To what extent and how does 
the representativeness affect the final judgment 
according to the Bayes’ rule? 
3.1. Definition of Representativeness 
All models described in the following propose 
representativeness as the ratio between the 
likelihood of the reference hypothesis hj  and its 
negation −hj, or a set of alternative hypotheses. 
This agreement on the representativeness 
formulation is in line with Tversky and Kahneman 
definition of representativeness (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983), they write that “an attribute is 
representative of a class if it is very diagnostic; 
that is, the relative frequency of this attribute is 
much higher in that class than in the relevant 
reference class.” Bordalo et al. state the 
representativeness that a class Ci observed from a 
set of data y, such that y
k
∈{C1,…,Ci,…,Cm} , 





Therefore, they assume that a class Ci  is 
representative for a hypothesis hj, relative to an 
alternative hypothesis −hj, if it scores high on the 
likelihood ratio described by Eq. (2). Edward and 
Gigerenzer agree on Eq. (2). Tenenbaum and 
Griffiths and Grether measure it with the same 
likelihood ratio, but adjusted with a logarithm 
scale to have a natural measure of how good a 
class Ci is in representing a hypothesis hj: 




3.2. Representativeness in judgments 
To evaluate how representativeness affects the 
final judgment of a hypothesis, we must 
understand how to calculate the posterior 
probability of the hypothesis hj, by considering a 
possible distortion in the likelihood term due to 
this heuristic. This issue is clearly defined by the 
above-mentioned authors. In general, they 
provide a specific definition about what 
representativeness is, but they do not explain how 
it affects the posterior probability, i.e. how the 
standard Bayes’ rule, which reflects the judgment 
of a rational thinker, must be adjusted to consider 
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representativeness instead. Just Bordalo et al. and 
Grether try to explain how to calculate this 
distorted posterior probability. Bordalo et al. 







where θ is a subjective parameter that has to be 
calibrated with cognitive tests and could vary 
considerably among different people. 
Consequently, according to Bayes’ theorem, the 







A different approach is provided by Grether; he 
suggests a model that provides the final judgment 
of hj, by considering the representativeness: 
log O(hj|Ci) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∙R(Ci, hj) + 𝛽2∙logO(hj) , (6) 
where log𝑂(ℎ𝑗|𝐶𝑖) is the posterior odds, R(Ci, hj) 
is the representativeness, logO(hj)  is the prior 
odds, while 𝛼 , 𝛽1  and 𝛽2  are subjective 
parameters that must be calibrated. Thus, the 
interpretation of Kahneman and Tversky’s 
representativeness heuristic suggested by the 
author is that individuals place greater weight on 
the likelihood ratio than on the prior odds. 




 ≥  0 
for the representativeness model, in contrast with 




= >0 of the Bayes’ rule. 
4. RELIABILITY-BASED BRIDGE 
MANAGEMENT 
The Autonomous Province of Trento (APT) has 
the ownership and the management of 
approximately 936 bridges. Consequently, APT 
committed the realization of a Bridge 
Management System (BMS) to University of 
Trento in 2004. The aim was to develop a 
management tool which could enable a systematic 
determination of the present and future need for 
maintenance, rehabilitation and replacement of 
bridges using various scenarios, along with a 
prioritization system which would provide 
guidance in the effective utilization of available 
funds. To combine simplicity and efficiency, the 
bridge is broken down into Structural Units (SU), 
such as deck, piles, abutments, which include a set 
of Standard Elements (SE), specified in terms of 
quantity and Condition State (CS). CS are 
evaluated based on scheduled inspections 
according to the APT evaluation manual, which in 
turn partially refers to AASHTO (1997) 
Commonly Recognized (CoRe) Standard Element 
System (American Ass. State Highway and 
Transportation Off, 1997). Since 1995, the CoRe 
element standard has been adopted by FHWA and 
AASHTO to measure bridges condition on a 
single scale that reflects the most common 
processes of deterioration, to provide 
performance-based decision support that includes 
economic considerations. Five deterioration 
levels, called CS, have been defined, among 
which each bridge element is allocated based on 
the visual observations of an inspector. Based on 
the outcomes of a special inspection, the System 
Manager can stop the evaluation procedure, 
activate a safety assessment procedure or directly 
proceed with an intervention (Zonta, et al., 2007). 
The goal of this work is to estimate how big is the 
error committed by a biased manager in judging 
the bridge state when this is presented under low 
frequency CS, i.e. very representative of failure. 
4.1. Application: SP65 bridge on the Maso River 
The SP65 bridge on the Maso river (Figure 2), is 
a common type of bridge in the APT stock. The 
bridge was formally evaluated during the start-up 
phase, through the full application of the five-step 
assessment procedure (Zonta, et al., 2007). To 
analyze representativeness in visual inspections, 
we limit our analysis to a single SU, the slab. 
Table 1 reports slab state descriptions and the 
related possible actions for every CS, available 
from the website of the APT-BMS. We want to 
assess how much representativeness distorts 
manager’s judgment compared to the Bayesian 
approach and to investigate how much high CS, 
as CS5, are representative for two possible state of 
the slab: “SAFE=hS” and “FAIL=hF”. 
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Figure 2: SP65 bridge: (a) overview; (b) plan 
view, elevation and cross section of the deck. 
 
 
Table 1: SU SLAB - State description and action for 
each Condition State (CS). 
 Slab surface state description  Action 
1 




Possible delamination, spalling 
or water infiltration. Possible 






Previously repaired or subjected 
to delamination or spalling. 
Segregation and consequently 
reinforcement exposure. 




Protection system  
4 
Extended parts previously 
repaired or subject to 
delamination or spalling; deep 
segregation phenomena with 
extended exposure of 





Protection system  
5 
Deep deterioration or 
anomalies. Reinforcement 
corrosion and cross-section loss 
require a deep analysis to verify 






We know that, in average, among all the APT 
bridges stock, the percentage of possible failure is 
very low compared to the safe condition. 
Consequently, we chose a prior probability 
P(hF)=0.001 for the state hypothesis “FAIL” and 
P(hS)=0.999 for the state hypothesis “SAFE”. We 
want to answer, from a mathematical point of 
view, the frequent questions: “How much CS5 is 
representative of bridge failure?”, “How distorted 
could be the judgment of a biased inspector that 
observe the bridge classified in CS5”, “Is his 
judgment coherent with the Bayes’ rule?” We 
have first to define a proper likelihood distribution 
for each hypothesis P(CSi|hF)  and P(CSi|ℎ𝑆) . 
According to (Melchers, 1999), we employ II 
level probabilistic methods, which allows to 
calculate the reliability index β=-Φ(PhF), where Φ 
is a cumulative normal distribution function. Two 
normal distributions are considered: the loads 
effect S and the starting resistance R0  of the 
bridge. We assume that the structure will not 
maintain its mechanical characteristics in the 
years, i.e. we have to consider the deterioration of 
construction material through a probabilistic 
degradation model 𝑅 = 𝑅0(1 − δ(CSi))  (Zonta, 
et al., 2007), where δ(CSi)  is a probabilistic 
capacity degradation function, depending only on 
the CSi of the SE that control the capacity of the 
SU at the limit state. Typically, low values of CS 
are not associated with any loss of capacity, and 
in this case δ𝑖  coincides with a Dirac delta 
function. Higher CSs are associated with 
distributions that reflect the uncertainty of the 
system in correlating the actual loss in capacity. 
CS4 is associated with a uniform distribution δ4 
of loss in capacity, for values of δ = [0,5%]. In the 
same way, the system associates CS5  with a 
triangular distribution, for δ =[5%,70%]. It is 
convenient to define a normalized capacity r =
R0  μS⁄ , with mean value  μr =  μ𝑅0  μS
⁄ , equal to 
the central safety factor γ
0
 associated with the 
limit state Z, and a normalized demand s = S  μ
S
⁄  
with mean value  μ
S
= 1 . The coefficients of 
variations of the normalized variables are equal to 
those of R and S.  The failure probability PhF 
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associated with normalized limit state equation 
z = r-s  is PhF(CS𝑖)= P(Z<0)=P(z<0). According 
to Eurocode 0, if we employ II level probabilistic 
methods, the target reliability index β for Class 
RC2 structural member in the ULS and with a 
reference time of 1 year is equal to β=4.75. Using 




2 ), we can obtain γ
0
= 1.96 . 
Then PhF(CS𝑖) is calculated through Montecarlo 
by computing the cumulative-time failure 
probability of the normalized limit state z, by 
using the normalized Gaussian distribution for the 
demand  f
𝑆
(r)=norm(𝑠, 1, 𝑉𝑆)  and a normalized 
non-Gaussian distribution for the reduced 
capacity  f
r
(r,CSi ) = norm(γ0, 1, 𝑉𝑅) ∙ (1-δ(CSi) . 
For each Condition State CS𝑖 , we obtain: 
PhF(CS𝑖) = [6.12 ∙ 10
-5, 2.68 ∙ 10-6, 6.47 ∙ 10-6, 
6.61 ∙ 10-4, 2.04 ∙ 10-1]. Assuming a priori 
P(CSi)=[50, 20, 15,10, 5]% , we obtain 
PhF =0.0103 and consequently PhS =0.9897. Then, 
according to Bayes’ rule , for both hypothesis 
“S=SAFE” and “F=FAIL”, we can calculate the 
relative likelihood distributions for each 
Condition State CS𝑖 (Figure 3). To be consistent 
in our case study with these outcomes, we choose 
the following likelihood distributions: 
P(CSi|hF)=[0,0,0,2,98]%, P(CSi|hS)=[50,20,15,10,5]%. 
Once we know the likelihood distributions, we 
can calculate how much CS5 is representative of 
the hypothesis hF  through all the 
representativeness models of Section 3; we can 
also calculate the posterior odds of the inspector 
distorted by the representativeness heuristic. 
 
Figure 3: Likelihood distributions for each hi. 
Table 2 reports all the results: as we can observe, 
rational managers, in line with Bayes’ rule and 
after observing  CS5, would judge the possibility 
that the bridge could fail as very unlikely, i.e. 
P( hF | CS5 )= 1.92%  and P( hS | CS5 )= 98.08% . 
Contrary, representativeness models provide a 
significantly distorted probability. For instance, 
according to Bordalo et al., the failure probability 
of the bridge P(hF|CS5)=69.74%, is double the 
probability of a safe state, i.e. P(hS|CS5)=30.26%. 
According to Grether’s model, the posterior odds 
of the failure condition against the safe condition, 
given CS5, are clearly higher than one. CS5 is very 
representative for the failure condition and all 
models agree on that, R(CS5|hF)≫R(CS5|hS) . 
Consequently, when irrational managers judge the 
state of a bridge by observing a high CS, as CS5, 
they are biased by representativeness: in their 
posterior judgments they tend to neglect the prior 
probability of the failure condition and to weight 
too much the likelihood of the observations; so, 
their final judgments are distorted.
Table 2: Achieved results for each model. 
Model 










P(CS5|hF) = 98 
P(CS|hS) = 5 
P(hF|CS5) = 1.92% 
P(hS|CS5) = 98.08%  
P(hF|CS5)  
P(hS|CS5) 
 = 0.20  
Grether 1980-1992 
(α=0; β1=0.8; β2=0.2) 
R(CS5 |hF) = 2.98 




 = 2.73  
Bordalo et al. 
2016 (θ=0.8) 
R(CS5 |hF) = 19.6 
R(CS5 |hS) = 0.05 
P(hF|CS5) = 69.74% 
P(hS|CS5) = 30.26%  
P(hF|CS5)  
P(hS|CS5) 
 = 2.30  
13th International Conference on Applications of Statistics and Probability in Civil Engineering, ICASP13 
Seoul, South Korea, May 26-30, 2019 
 8 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Nowadays managers are faced with many 
competing priorities and must rely on 
computerized data processing when managing 
large infrastructure assets. This “management by 
data” is only possible when there is an 
understanding of what the data represents and a 
trust in the quality of the data. For collecting 
bridge data, it can be used the “Commonly 
Recognized (CoRe) Elements for Bridge 
Inspection”, which allow to classify bridges in a 
limited number of Condition States (CS). 
However, questions as: “How is a single CS 
representative of the real state of the bridge under 
exam?”; “Are decision makers biased by 
heuristics when they face highest CS?”; “How are 
posterior probabilities distorted by 
representativeness if people behave irrationally?”, 
have still no answer. We tried to answer by 
analyzing how representativeness, the main 
heuristic by Kahneman and Tversky, influences 
the interpretation of data, leading different results 
in comparison to those achieved with the classical 
rational method of Bayes’ rule. After defining and 
contextualizing representativeness from a 
mathematical point of view, we applied existing 
representativeness models from literature to the 
judgment of the state of a concrete bridge, based 
on visual inspections. Our results demonstrate the 
consequential distortions from rational decision 
making of this heuristic. 
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